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BOOK REVIEWS
THE Nua zwimm TRI ANn AGORESSIVE WAR. By Sheldon Glueck, 1946.
Alfred H. Knopf, New York. Pp. 120. $2.00.
This small volume introduced by Mr. Justice Jackson, United States
Chief of Council in the Nuremberg Trial, consists of the author's
article published in the Harvard Law Review in the spring of 1946.
The only changes consist in the insertion of some long footnotes of the
article in the text of the book and others in appendices. The author
acknowledges that he has modified one position which he took in his
book on War Criminals published in 1944. There he had denied that
the initiation of aggressive war was a crime. The present volume is
mainly a justification based on customary and conventional interna-
tional law for the inclusion of that crime in the Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal. The author believes that his discussion
justifies the conclusion: "that the waging of an aggressive war is not
only unlawful but also criminal, and that there is nothing fundamen-
tally 'retrospective' or unjust either in recognizing this fact or in hold-
ing individual members of a Government personally liable for crim-
inal acts committed in the name of the State." (p. 91.)
The arguments presented take in the main the line taken by Mr.
Justice Jackson in opening the argument of the Prosecution at Nurem-
berg, namely: that a rule of customary international law had developed
through the practice, declarations and agreements of states before the
Nazi aggressions occurred establishing the initiation of aggressive
war as an individual offense. The author maintains his earlier inter-
pretation that the Pact of Paris did not in itself establish aggressive
war as a crime, though he cites some opinions which attribute to it
that effect (p. 18). The significance of the Pact, he thinks, lies rather
in the evidence it affords of the existence of a rule of customary inter-
national law and in its influence upon the "defense of justification."
Since the Pact clearly made it illegal for Germany to authorize aggres-
sive war, individuals initiating such a war in the name of Germany
cannot justify themselves by claiming that their acts were lawful acts
of the German State. "As applied to acts chargeable as crimes, aggres-
sive war can no longer be a legal justification and shield" (p. 107).
The author goes at length into the general proposition that "acts of
state" in violation of the state's obligations under international law
cannot confer immunity upon individuals (p. 52). The discussion on
this point (p. 46 ff.) on the nature of customary law (p. 34 ff.), on the
relation of individuals to international law (p. 60 ff.), on the scope of
the ex post facto rule (p. 74 ff.), and on the jurisdiction of the Nurem-
berg tribunal are excellent (p. 85 ff.).
The author develops the legal case for the Nuremberg trial so well
that it is regrettable that he repeated the statement in his earlier vol-
ume, that "the United Nations could have executed the Nuremberg
defendants without any judicial procedure whatsoever" (p. 8). His
effort to support the proposition by arguing that the "will of the
victor" is law for the vanquished, that international agreements made
under duress are valid, and that enemy leaders like Napoleon have
been dealt with politically, is not convincing. There is a conventional
rule of international law that prisoners of war cannot be punished
without trial, and the rule is well established in numerous interna-
tional arbitrations that punishment of resident aliens without trial is a
denial of justice and a violation of international law.
It is true, international law may require states to punish individuals
within their jurisdiction who have committed offenses against interna-
tional law to the injury of other states, and it is also true that a state
cannot excuse its failure to perform this international duty by the
plea that its criminal law did not include the offense. In such cases
the state should provide for trial by special legislation. If the accused
individual is found guilty and punished there would be no violation of
the ex post facto rule because the act was an offense against interna-
tional law when committed.
Certainly, with the present emphasis upon "human rights," punish-
ment of individuals without formal charge and fair trial cannot be con-
sidered permissible under international law. If individuals are to be
regarded as subjects of international law, and they must if the concept
of individual offenses against the law of nations is accepted, an agree-
ment between states to which the individual is not a party cannot
deprive him of that human right.
In spite of his attempt to show that political treatment of the Nazi
leaders would have been justifiable, the author does not criticize the
United Nations for deciding to proceed in a more "civilized way"
(p. 11), and he points out the care taken by the tribunal at Nuremberg
to conduct the trial fairly, giving the defendants every opportunity for
defense.
This volume was published before the opinion was rendered by the
tribunal at Nuremberg, but Glueck's exposition of the law appears to
be consistent with that accepted by the tribunal. Because it was bound
by the Charter, the tribunal found it necessary to deal only briefly
with the justification in general international law of the law and juris-
diction provided for it in that instrument. On this subject, the present
volume offers jurists a useful background.
QUINCY WRIGHT.
University of Chicago.
ADOLESCENCE AND YOUTH, THE PROCESS OF MATURING. By Paul H. Lan-
dis. First Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York
and London, 1945. Pp. vii plus 470. $3.00.
This book by an educator is here reviewed by a psychiatrist. The
author in general states that what we call adolescence (and youth) is
made up of three aspects: physiological puberty, the psychological
experience of attaining maturity, and the sociological experience of
adjustment. He stresses mainly the latter aspect.
Biological, psychoanalytical and psychiatric facts are left in the
background if they are not expressly taken exception with. In the
treatment of the sociological aspect interesting relationships are
brought to the fore. The author bases his views mainly on Margaret
Mead's observations (Margaret Mead: Adolescence in Primitive and
Modern Society; on V. C. Calverton and Samuel D. Schmalhausen,
The New Generation, Macaulay Company, N. Y., 1930; and on Coming
of Age in Samoa, William Morrow and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1928). He
stresses the cultural (man-made) influences in that period which, as
he says, erroneously has been called a critical one by the biologists
and psychiatrists.
The author's own contributions to our problem are mainly in the
interrelationships between adolescence and the structure of population
as to age, earning power, etc. Here again the author rightly brings to
the fore the relationships between culture and tho length of that span
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which we call adolescence or youth. The book, which marshals its
facts thoroughly, can be warmly recommended especially to biologists,
psychoanalysts and psychiatrists in order to see how the facts may or




THE CRIME OF IMPRISONMENT. By George Bernard Shaw. Illustrated
by William Gropper. Philosophical Library, New York. Pp. 125.$2.00.
This is an essay, written after the last war in behalf of the British
Labor Research Office. It is a plea to revise the common system of
imprisonment. It is in typical Shaw style. In his ninety or so years
on this globe Shaw has criticized many things, many of which he
knew little about. Among his subjects here are: "The Seamy Side of
Deterence," "Judicial Vengeance," "The Incorrigible Villains," "The
Ruthlessness of the Pure Heart," "Remedies in the Rough," "The Sen-
timentality of Revenge," and "The So Called Criminal Type." One
gathers from a careful study of "The Crime of Imprisonment" that,
starting from the title, Shaw would recommend that all jails be
emptied and refilled by law enforcement officers, judges, prosecutors;
and so he does as judged by the following remarks: "I thought, and
still think, imprisonment for life a curious sort of mercy." "Imprison-
ment as it exists today is a worse crime than any of those committed
by its victims." Shaw says our prisons are not the Ritz Hotel, as the
lodging, the food, the bed, are all deliberately made so uncomfortable
as to be instruments of torture, as the clothes worn are rags promis-
cuously worn by all your fellow prisoners in turn with yourself, the
exercise is that of a turnspit, when the ventilation and sanitation are
noisome, when the instruction is a sham, the education a fraud, the
doctor is a bully to whom your ailments are all malingerings, and the
chaplain a moral snob with no time for anything but the distribution
of unreadable books. Shaw points to many of the faults of our penal
systems but like other curbstone critics he offers no practical solution.
Shaw says: "The thief who is in prison is not necessarily more dis-
honest than his fellows at large, but mostly only one who through
ignorance or stupidity, steals in a way that is not customary. It is
not true that men can be divided into absolutely honest persons and
absolutely dishonest ones. Our honesty varies with the strain put on
it." We have Shaw here trying to indict society for its handling of the
delinquent. Like all books by Shaw this one makes interesting reading
but read it as fiction, not fact.
JOHN I. HOWE.
Chicago Police.
